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The Limits of Victorian Federalism:
E. A. Freeman’s History of Federal Government

For Europeans in the 1860s, federalism was a familiar idea. Federations had been proposed as possible solutions for both Italian and German unification. In 1858, at Plombières, Louis Napoleon had suggested
reorganizing Italy as a federation of four princely states with the pope at
its head. A Germanic Confederation had existed ever since the Congress of Vienna, and after the Austrian War in 1866, Bismarck established a North German Confederation under the presidency of Prussia.
Federations might play a role in other parts of the continent as well.
After the Crimean War, for instance, a federation of Balkan states
seemed to offer an alternative to Ottoman dominion in southeastern
Europe. But federal governments were not without their problems.
Across the Atlantic, the American Civil War was testing the resilience of
the world’s largest federation, and for a moment at least this conflict
called into question the whole federalist enterprise.
English writers found the federal idea attractive in large part because it seemed to provide a solution to the problems posed by Europe’s
emerging nationalities. John Stuart Mill, in his Considerations on Representative Government (1861), raised the issue in exactly this context.
According to Mill, federations were most suitable in those regions
where a number of small states possessed similar interests based on
common language, religion, ethnicity and political institutions, but
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where traditions of independence prevented them from uniting in a
single consolidated state. Thus for Mill federations facilitated nationbuilding, the process whereby small states sharing a common nationality were amalgamated into larger entities. The advantage of a federation,
Mill went on, was that it would protect the member states from hostile
neighbors, particularly when those neighbors were “feudal monarchs”
who resented the liberal institutions that generally characterized federal
governments. Here the image of a federally united Italy facing an autocratic Austria came most readily to mind. Indeed, Mill wondered
whether a unified Italy might not be a perfect candidate for federal organization, though by the time Representative Government came out the
creation of a consolidated Italian monarchy had all but answered the
question.1
Mill’s ideas were symptomatic of the age as other writers were
drawn to federalism for similar reasons.2 In 1863, Edward Augustus
Freeman published the first volume of his History of Federal Government, a study of ancient Greek federalism under the Achaean League.3
Though unknown today, Freeman was undoubtedly the most enthusiastic advocate of the federal idea that Victorian England produced. He is
best considered a liberal nationalist who was drawn to federalism in
large part because it spoke to the problems posed by continental nationalism. 4 He regarded nationality as a linguistic and racial category,
and he anticipated the day when large states, each representing the will
of a single sovereign nation, would define the European state system.
He endorsed nationalist movements in Italy, Germany and the Balkans,
and opposed the Austrian and Ottoman empires on the grounds that
they violated the principles of nationality and popular sovereignty. To
help build these new nation-sates, Freeman pointed to federalism, arguing that federations would enable populations of similar nationality to
achieve independence, cohesion and security, while at the same time
establishing liberal governments in which decentralization would curb
the exercise of power.
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1
Freeman’s History of Federal Government was the first—and, as it
turned out, the only— installment of a much larger work. His original
intention was to write four volumes. Ancient Greek federalism under
the Achaean League, the Swiss Confederation from the thirteenth century to the present day, the United Provinces from their independence
to the French Revolution, and the development of federal government
in the United States were to have a volume each. But in the event,
Freeman wrote only the first. Though it was never completed as originally intended, the History of Federal Government was still a substantial
work, combining an introductory chapter on federalism in general with
a lengthy discussion of the Achaean League and other Greek attempts at
federation. In 1893, J. B. Bury oversaw a new edition of the book,
adding to the original text a few fragments found among Freeman’s papers.
Freeman’s federalism—the way he defined it and the advantages he
attached to it—spoke directly to contemporary European problems.
Indeed, the numerous references to current events that peppered the
History of Federal Government made it clear that present-day concerns
were never far from his mind as he wrote the book. The American Civil
War alone, he thought, had made the “origin” and “destiny” of federalism “the most interesting of all political problems.” 5 But more than
America, it was Europe he was contemplating: for in essence, federalism
was Freeman’s response to the rise of nationalism, especially in Italy and
the Balkans, the two areas of Europe most pressingly in need of redefinition. It was not accidental that Freeman began to write his History of
Federal Government during the Crimean War, a conflict that placed the
future of the Italian and the Balkan nations before the public. Federations, he suggested, would organize these emerging nationalities into
viable political units, establish peace and stability in two troubled re-
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gions, guarantee political and intellectual progress, and promote the
cause of freedom. As a rule, the Victorians favored large political units
and Freeman was no exception. Only states of considerable size, they
believed, would have the resources to support viable economies, provide
for defense and play a stabilizing role in the balance of power. Most
Victorian liberals, therefore, saw nationalism as a force leading to the
creation of large nation-states, whether in Germany, Italy or the Balkans. The problem confronting these liberal nationalists was how to overcome the strong divisions that stood in the way of consolidation, and
federalism seemed to provide the answer because of its respect for local
customs and allegiances.
In presenting federal ideas in a favorable light, Freeman was pursuing goals that were actually more conventional and limited than might
at first appear. He accepted the European state system as it functioned
in his own day: an arrangement of sovereign states, each independent,
recognizing no higher authority and existing in competition with one
another. He did not regard federalism as an alternative to this system, as
some kind of supranational organization regulating relations between
states and thus calling on its members to surrender a degree of their
autonomy. 6 He was not, in other words, a visionary dreaming of a federally united Europe. By the turn of the century, some English federalists would begin to think in these terms, but Freeman clearly did not.
As a mid-Victorian liberal, he thought within prevailing assumptions
and saw no need to replace the existing system with something new.
Indeed, for him federalism was a way to make this system work more
smoothly by reconstructing the messy parts of Europe—Italy, Germany,
the Balkans, the Habsburg lands—on the basis of large, stable states.
Nor did Freeman regard federalism as a solution to the constitutional
problems that arose in Britain in the 1880s and 1890s over Irish home
rule and imperial federation.7 Having derived his federalist principles
from a continental context, he was reluctant to apply them to Britain.
Because he saw federation as a means to build or preserve large states,
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he considered it applicable to those areas where large states did not exist. But such was not the case with Britain. To create a federal Britain by
sharing sovereignty with Ireland or the colonies would only reverse the
process of nation-building and weaken an already strong unitary state.
Freeman began his History with a definition: “A Federal Commonwealth,” he wrote, “…in its perfect form, is one which forms a single
state in its relations to other nations, but which consists of many states
with regard to its internal government.”8 Such an arrangement, he continued, usually arose when a number of smaller states united together
and delegated authority to a central government, which then presided
over their combined affairs. In joining a federation, however, member
states did not relinquish all their former independence, but rather retained absolute sovereignty over their own internal affairs: they could
determine their own laws and the forms of their own constitutions. In a
similar manner, the central government, while not permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of the member states, was absolutely sovereign
in those matters affecting the entire federation, especially its relationship with the outside world. “The making of peace and war, the sending
and receiving of ambassadors,” Freeman wrote, “generally all that comes
within the department of International Law, will be reserved wholly to
the central power. Indeed, the very existence of the several members of
the Union will be diplomatically unknown to foreign nations, which
will never be called upon to deal with any power except the Central
Government.” 9
In an effort to categorize this composite type of government, Freeman rejected the normal classification of monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy. A federal government, he pointed out, could actually fall
into any one of these classes since a union of democracies, aristocracies,
or even monarchies was each theoretically possible. Instead of using
these conventional categories, Freeman proposed to divide governments
by size into small or large states, a taxonomy that he believed would
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reveal the particular advantage of a federal system. As he explained: “A
Federal Government is most likely to be formed when the question
arises whether several small states shall remain perfectly independent, or
shall be consolidated into a single great state. A Federal tie harmonizes
the two contending principles by reconciling a certain amount of union
with a certain amount of independence. A Federal Government then is
a mean between the system of large states and the system of small
states.” 10 These small and large states, for Freeman, were also historically
specific. The small state, which must be small enough for all its citizens
to gather in one place for political purposes, had reached perfection in
the independent cities of ancient Greece. The large state, which must be
so large that the distances between citizens made such direct participation in politics impossible, had achieved perfection in the monarchies
of modern Europe.11 A federal state was then a compromise between
past and present: because it permitted small states to retain much of
their independence while grouping them in larger political units, it
would at its best combine the political freedom of the Greek city with
the stability of the large European monarchy.
The greatest advantage of the small state was its ability to educate
its citizens. By encouraging them to participate in politics, the ancient
Greek city gave its residents an unprecedented opportunity to learn the
skills and responsibilities of governing. A small state like Athens, Freeman declared with Victorian confidence, provided all its citizens with
the kind of political education that the contemporary House of Commons gave to its several hundred members. 12 The result was a people of
the highest political sophistication. Praising in this way the participatory politics of the ancient city state, Freeman came forward as an enthusiast for Athenian democracy. No other political system “made a greater
number of citizens fit to use power…,” he maintained: “…The Athenian citizen, by constantly hearing questions of foreign policy and domestic administration freely argued by the greatest orators that the
world ever saw, received a political education which nothing else in the
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history of mankind has ever been found to equal.” Only in a city like
Athens, he concluded, would “the average of political knowledge, and
indeed of general intelligence of every kind, be so high….”13 But the
small state had its drawbacks as well. The restricted size of the political
field tended to intensify rivalries and create lasting political divisions.
The absence of any overarching authority to which neighboring states
could appeal for justice made it all but inevitable that disputes between
them would be settled through war. Vicious internal strife and chronic
warfare ensured that the life of the small state would be short and its
history would be one of disorder and turmoil. 14
Providing peace and stability, however, was exactly what Freeman
thought the large modern kingdom did best. A central government,
presiding over numerous cities and treating each of its subjects impartially, would ensure that local disagreements were settled peacefully,
thereby avoiding the constant warfare that had plagued the ancient city
states. 15 When wars did break out between large states, they would also
tend to be less disruptive and less costly than the wars between either
ancient or modern cities. “A happily situated … nation may wage war
after war, and spend nothing except its treasures and the blood of the
soldiers actually engaged,” Freeman wrote with the optimism of one
who had not yet experienced twentieth-century war: “The wars which
we can ourselves remember, the Russian War of 1854–6 and the Lombard campaign of 1859, have been mere child’s play compared to the
great internal wars either of Greece or of Germany. The scale of the
powers engaged of course caused a tremendous loss of life among actual
combatants, but the general amount of misery inflicted on the world
was trifling in proportion to what was caused either by the Peloponnesian War or by the War of Thirty Years.” 16 But large modern kingdoms paid a price for this peace and stability. More orderly than the
ancient Greek cities, they were less able to engage their citizens politically, even when they were constitutional monarchies. Because of their
size, these large states were inevitably governed by representative assem-
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blies, a practice which limited the involvement of most citizens to the
election of those who would represent them. Such a system, Freeman
argued, removed the average citizen from the political process and contributed to his political debasement. Electors were often “ignorant and
careless of public affairs.” They often cast their votes “blindly, recklessly,
and corruptly.” Some did not even bother to vote, while others sold
their votes. “Ignorance, carelessness, and corruption”—these, Freeman
concluded, were the shortcomings of large-scale representative government.17
Forced to choose between the vital but turbulent politics of the city
state and the orderly but disengaged politics of the large monarchy,
Freeman knew where his preference lay. The Greek city, he readily admitted, was a thing of the past and could not be recalled. The large
monarchy, with its representative institutions, was the great Teutonic
contribution to politics and it had brought a well needed stability to
much of Europe. But the beauty of the federation, which combined the
best of both the small and large state, was that one did not have to
choose. A federal government, Freeman argued, would guarantee stability almost as effectively as a monarchy because, like the monarchy, it
had the power to adjudicate peacefully any disputes that arose among
its constituents.18 A federal government would educate its citizens almost as effectively as a city state because the principle of decentralization, which defined the federation, would foster a genuine respect for
traditions of local self-government—and, for Freeman, nothing was
more likely to improve citizens politically than the experience of governing themselves. In a federation, he wrote, “republican habits and
feelings will cause appeals to the people to be far more common and far
more direct than is usual in a monarchic state. Political meetings and
regularly organized Conventions will be far more common and far
more influential.” Above all, the principal that each member state
should manage its own affairs without interference from above would
naturally ensure that these states grant a large amount of municipal lib-
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erty to their own counties, cities and towns. “In the New England
States,” Freeman noted, “where the true Federal model is best carried
out, local Self-Government seems to have reached its fullest development.” There, amid the excitement of the New England town meeting,
citizens received a kind of political education that was unavailable in
the centralized monarchies of contemporary Europe.19
Freeman’s History of Federal Government was the most sophisticated
treatment of its subject to appear in England during the nineteenth
century and it revealed the parameters that shaped most Victorian
thinking about federalism.20 For Freeman, as for Mill and others, federation was a process of building nations, not of breaking them apart, and
it was applicable therefore only to those areas where large states were
lacking. The goal of federation was to achieve international stability
within the existing state system and domestic freedom based on local
self-government. As Freeman’s comments on war made clear, he did not
envision a world free of conflict, but rather a system of independent
states where the disruption, frequency and cost of war was lessened because the states involved were large. As his comments on New England
made clear, he approved of federal government because it encouraged a
decentralized but orderly democracy. Such was Freeman’s understanding
of federalism, and his discussion of it placed him in the forefront of
progressive thinking in England. In his Considerations on Representative
Government, Mill had evaluated government on the same grounds as
Freeman. For Mill, as for Freeman, the purpose of government was to
foster “virtue and intelligence” among the governed and ancient Athens
was the one place where this had been done most effectively. The experience of Athenian democracy, Mill wrote, anticipating Freeman,
“raised the intellectual standard of an average Athenian citizen far beyond anything of which there is yet an example in any other mass of
men, ancient or modern. The proofs of this are apparent in every page
of our great historian of Greece....” The reference to George Grote’s History of Greece (1846–1856) is instructive: for by the mid-nineteenth
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century, ancient Athens had become a litmus test for attitudes to
democracy, and Grote’s vindication of Athenian democracy, which
Freeman and Mill both praised, was one of the great works of Victorian
radicalism.21
2
Freeman chose to illustrate the advantages of federalism for nationbuilding by turning to antiquity and writing a history of the Achaean
League, a confederation of Greek cities whose leader, Aratus, united the
Greeks and drove the Macedonians from the Peloponnese. That Freeman should have looked to ancient Greece was not surprising. The Victorians, after all, were immersed in the classical past. But they did not
consider all periods equal, preferring the Athens of Plato and Thucydides to the later periods. Freeman, however, saw things differently. He
was drawn to later Greek history precisely because of its modernity: “…
it is the history of a complex political world, in which single cities,
monarchies, and Federations, all play their part, just as they do in the
European history of later times.” 22 As Freeman told the story of the
Achaean League, he drew an explicit parallel between past and present:
the League’s rise was nothing less than a “national struggle of Greece
against Macedonia” that resembled the campaigns for Italian unification, which he considered “the most glorious event of our own day.”23
Macedonia was a foreign power holding the Greeks in subjection, much
as Austria had dominated Italy, and the League stood for unification.
The lessons of ancient Greece were many. Athens gave the world philosophy, art, poetry. The Achaean League gave the world a different lesson: how to unite, throw off the oppressor, and achieve national freedom. “For a hundred and forty years,” Freeman concluded, “…the
League had given to a larger portion of Greece than any previous age
had seen, a measure of freedom, unity, and general good government,
which may well atone for the lack of the dazzling glory of the old

Freeman and Victorian Federalism 11

Athenian Democracy. It was no slight achievement to weld together so
many cities into an Union which strengthened them against foreign
Kings and Senates, and which yet preserved to them that internal independence which was so dear to the Hellenic mind.” 24
If, as Freeman wanted us to believe, the Achaean League fought the
war of Greek independence, then Aratus was its Cavour: he was “devoted to the cause of freedom,” to extending “the area of free Greece,” and
the League under his leadership became “a great Pan-hellenic power, the
centre of Grecian freedom, the foe of Tyrants and the refuge of the oppressed.”25 But if Aratus achieved independence and unity, he did so at
a cost. Sparta stood in the way of Greek unification. Just as Cavour
would cede Nice and Savoy to France in order to secure Louis
Napoleon’s support in the campaign against Austria, so Aratus restored
Corinth to Macedonia as the price of Macedonian aid in the war
against Sparta. Freeman drew out the parallel between the two rulers:
There is indeed much likeness in the character and career of the
two men; each sought the noblest of ends, but neither was so
scrupulous as strict morality could wish as to the means by which
those ends were to be compassed. Each was, in his own age, unrivalled for parliamentary and diplomatic skill; each indulged in the
same dark and crooked policy…. But the cession of Akrokorinthos
was a deeper sin against freedom than the cession of Savoy and
Nizza. Both the Achaian and the Italian statesman surrendered a
portion of the land which he had saved into the hands of a foreign
despot; one surrendered his own ancestral province, the other surrendered the scene of his own most glorious exploit. Each deed was
equally the betrayal of a trust, the narrowing of the area of
freedom.26
So the parallel was imperfect—Freeman preferred Cavour to Aratus,
finding Cavour’s crime less odious—but that was hardly the point. As
an example of political rhetoric, Freeman’s juxtaposition of past and
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present, of Aratus and Cavour, served to establish ancient Greek federalism and the Achaean League as a paradigm for modern nation-building.
Freeman intended his work as a piece of scholarship and in all fairness we ought to evaluate it as a contribution to classical historiography,
not as a tract for the times. But scattered among the mind-numbing
details that made up his description of the Achaean constitution were
observations suggesting that he intended his work to speak to contemporary events. For example, his description of the League’s constitution
emphasized its modern and liberal attributes, rendering it a suitable
model for nineteenth-century nation-building. It was “strictly Federal”
according to his definition: each city was independent regarding its internal affairs, a federal government determined relations with other
states, and both city and federal governments were “democratic.”27
Freeman’s frequent comparisons of the Achaean and British constitutions, combined with his use of Victorian terminology, only reinforced
the present-mindedness of his analysis. The Achaean federal assembly,
he maintained, resembled the House of Commons, its magistrates acted
as “Ministers” comprising a “Cabinet,” and there was a “Government”
and an “Opposition.”28 His conclusion only perpetuated the confusion
of past and present: “Altogether the general practical working of the
Achaian system was a remarkable advance in the direction of modern
constitutional government. And it especially resembles our own system
in leaving to usage, to the discretion of particular persons and Assemblies, and to the natural working of circumstances, much which nations
of a more theoretical turn of mind might have sought to rule by positive law.” 29 Freeman’s ancient Greeks were Burkeans, eschewing abstract
design and allowing precedence and circumstances to direct change,
and their respect for constitutional procedures was English at heart.
Having asserted the suitability of the Achaean League as a model
for contemporary nation-building, Freeman applied it to those areas in
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Europe where nationalism was forcing change: Italy, Greece, and the
Balkans generally. Like so many English liberals, Freeman had been a
longtime advocate of Italian nationality. As we have seen, Cavour assumed heroic proportions in his Federal Government as the statesman
who unified Italy by liberating it from Austrian domination. But Italy
in fact troubled Freeman because events there had not gone quite as he
thought they should. He had always hoped that Italian unification
would result in a federation rather than in a single consolidated monarchy. The conditions for federal government were all present: “The historic greatness of her cities, the wide diversities among her several provinces, the difference in feelings, manners, and even language, between
Sicily, Rome, Tuscany, Venice, and Piedmont, all pointed to a Federal
Union as the natural form for Italian freedom to assume. It seemed, on
every ground, to be the form of unity under which Italy might look for
the highest amount of internal prosperity and contentment.” 30 But the
Italians had decided otherwise, and with the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy all prospects for an Italian federation had vanished.
Freeman’s approach to Italy demonstrated the limitations of his
historical rhetoric. By associating Aratus with Cavour, he had hoped to
establish Achaean federalism as a viable model for nation-building. But
this rhetorical strategy contained a flaw. The juxtaposition of Cavour
and Aratus, rather than legitimating the Achaeans, could just as easily
serve to discredit Cavour’s achievement. Whereas Aratus had gathered
the Greek cities into a federation, Cavour delivered the Italian states to
Victor Emanuel in the form of a consolidated monarchy. Cavour, it
turned out, was not the kind of nation-builder that Freeman thought
he was, and Italian unification had not followed the course that Freeman had marked out for it. In 1857, he had warned that Italian unification should not come about through the expansion of Piedmont because that would only undermine local liberties and lead to excessive
centralization: “…No lover of Italy could endure to see Milan, and
Venice, and Florence, and the Eternal City itself sink into provincial
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dependencies of the Savoyard.” 31 And yet this was exactly what had
happened. Even after unification was complete, Freeman continued to
urge that Italy should pursue federal policies in order to avoid becoming centralized along French lines: “…It is not too late to say that the
true policy of the Italian Kingdom will be to approach as near to the
Federal type as a Consolidated state can approach. It should keep as far
as possible from the deadening system of French centralization; it
should give every province, every city, every district, the greatest
amount of local independence consistent with the common national
action of the whole realm. Naples and Florence and Milan must not be
allowed for a moment to feel themselves in bondage to an upstart rival
like Turin. It is only by establishing perfect equality, and therefore perfect local independence, through every corner of his realm that the
King of Piedmont can grow into a true King of Italy….”32
Greece was another troubled region that Freeman thought would
have benefited from federal government. Late in life he described himself as a philhellene of fifty years, and throughout his career he was as
passionate for the liberation of Greece as he was for the unification of
Italy. 33 But Greece had its problems as well: critics frequently accused
the state of being one of the worst governed in Europe. Freeman admitted the charge, but placed much of the blame for this condition on interference by the great powers. Had Greece been left alone, he claimed,
it would have developed into a federation: “Now all history tells me
that a people winning its independence naturally adopts as its constitution the form of a Federal Republic. Instances two thousand years apart
from each other all preach the same lesson. Achaia, Switzerland, Holland, America, all followed the same invariable impulse.” Conditions in
Greece, he continued, were conducive to federation: The country contained many geographically isolated communities that called out for
local independence. The Ottomans had allowed the Greeks to retain
“rude forms of municipality and self-government,” which could have
provided the basis for a federal arrangement. A federal government
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would have accommodated the many minorities that fell within the
borders of Greece: Albanians, Turks, Slavs, Wallachs, Jews. But instead
of allowing Greece to develop in a federal direction, the great powers
imposed a Bavarian monarchy which ignored these strong tendencies
toward federation and established a centralized bureaucracy. A monarchy may have been necessary, but if Greece were to be governed well it
should have been a monarchy that would have restored as much federal
freedom as was consistent with a strong central authority. 34
But Freeman was thinking about the Balkans in general more than
about Italy or Greece. His interest in federal government had coalesced
around the time of the Crimean War, as the Russian advance into Wallachia and Moldavia, which forced the Ottomans to withdraw from the
two principalities, raised the possibility of a new political arrangement
in southeastern Europe. Freeman had always disliked the Ottomans:
they were oppressors, the traditional enemy of Christian civilization, an
Asian power encamped on European soil that would never assimilate to
the West and therefore ought to go.35 In 1855, as the war drew to a
close, he delivered a set of lectures on the History and Conquests of the
Saracens that provided a historical justification for their removal. For
Freeman, East and West had precise geographical boundaries. All lands
that had fallen under the sway of either the Roman or Byzantine empires he considered European: their inhabitants had been Christian, had
participated in Greco-Roman civilization, had at one time spoken either Greek or Latin, and had adhered to western political principles
such as the rule of law. But the advance of Islam had eroded the edges
of this European civilization. The Moorish conquest of Spain and the
Ottoman conquest of the Balkans were phases of a single movement
that had taken from Europe lands that were rightfully its own. The
burden of history, as Freeman felt it, was to reclaim Europe for itself
and for Christianity. The ejection of the Moors from Spain had started
the process and the liberation of the Balkans must now complete it.36
The question was how to accomplish this feat, and here federalism sup-
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plied the answer. Just as the Achaean League had united the Greeks and
given them the strength to defeat the Macedonians, so a Balkan federation would provide the nations of southeastern Europe with the means
to achieve their liberation. Searching for the common ground on which
to build the federation, Freeman pointed to history and religion. It
would be a federation of monarchies—Balkan political traditions were
not republican—united by Orthodox Christianity, a common sense of
having suffered for centuries at the hands of the Ottomans, and a reverence for the Byzantine Empire. 37
As this appreciation of Europe’s Byzantine past suggests, Freeman’s
History of Federal Government was a very philhellenic work. It told the
story of a heroic moment in Greek history, an early attempt to forge a
Greek nation. It located the origin of the federal idea in the Greek past,
appealed to the robust democracy of the Greek city-state as a remedy
against excessive centralization, and pointed to the achievements of the
Achaean League in order to demonstrate the value of federations for
nation-building. As such it was a effective example of political rhetoric,
making its case by appealing to ancient Greece, a civilization that enjoyed a privileged position in Victorian culture. The History of Federal
Government was also a book with a purpose, as Freeman applied his
federal thinking to those parts of Europe where the emergence of nationalism was making itself felt. He believed that Italy and Greece
would have benefited from federal organization, and he urged the creation of a Balkan federation, hoping it would restore Europe by rescuing the region from Ottoman domination.
3
Freeman never completed the History of Federal Government. The
final three volumes languished, un-researched and unwritten. But his
interest in federalism persisted all the same. He welcomed the formation of a unified Germany, seeing it as an interesting example of a fed-
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eration of monarchies, and when the Eastern Question erupted in violence in the 1870s, he once again thought of applying the federal model
to the Balkans. 38 But when spokesmen for Irish home rule and imperial
federation turned federalism into a domestic issue, he was less than enthusiastic. It was only natural that Freeman, an advocate of the rights of
nationality in other parts of Europe, would be drawn to embrace home
rule for Ireland, especially after Gladstone took up the cause. 39 He also
saw the attraction of creating stronger ties between Britain and its English-speaking colonies, including its former possession, the United
States.40 But no matter how sympathetic he was to the cause of home
rule, no matter how strong his desire to unite the Anglophone world,
he seriously doubted whether the constitutional relationship between
either Great Britain and Ireland or Great Britain and its colonies could
be established successfully on a federal basis. Federations, he argued,
repeating what he had already said in his History of Federal Government,
were only suitable in certain circumstances. Whereas they had a role to
play whenever a number of small states were amalgamating into a larger
one, they were unlikely to work when a large state was breaking apart.
This had been the lesson of history—“that the Federal relation is in its
place when it tries to unite and not when it tries to disunite” 41—and he
pointed to the formation of the Swiss and American federations as examples. In both cases, he noted, federalism had initiated a process of
amalgamation that over time would probably result in consolidated
states. 42
Freeman then applied this lesson to home rule. A truly federal solution to the Irish problem would require Britain and Ireland each to surrender a degree of sovereignty to a federal government that would then
preside over their common affairs. A more thorough federalism would
go even further: it would call for the establishment of Ireland, England,
Scotland and Wales as autonomous states, which would then surrender
sovereignty to a federal parliament. But for Freeman such a solution
was unrealistic because it would reverse the direction toward greater
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consolidation in which federations historically proceeded. 43 The fact
was, he concluded, Ireland was a British dependency, and the only practical way for it to achieve home rule would be for Britain to delegate it
certain sovereign powers. Such a procedure would grant Ireland greater
autonomy, but the relationship between the two countries would not be
federal since Ireland would remain a dependency. 44 A federal arrangement for the empire was equally unworkable, and for similar reasons.
The colonies, he observed, like Ireland, were dependencies. For Britain
to share sovereignty with them in a federation would require Britain to
relinquish certain powers, most importantly control over foreign affairs,
to a federal government. It was one thing for a number of small states
to do this because in the long run they would gain from the added
strength that federation would bring. But for a large, consolidated state
like Britain to lose its independence by sharing sovereignty with its dependencies was historically unprecedented: “The proposal that a ruling
state … should come down from its position of empire, and enter into
terms of equal confederation with its subject communities, is a very
remarkable proposal, and one which perhaps never before had been
made in the history of the world.”45
Freeman’s reluctance to extend federal ties to Ireland or the empire
underscores the limitations of his federalist thinking, especially in its
practical application. A reading of the History of Federal Government
leaves the unmistakable impression that he admired federations most of
all because of their military potential, their ability to bring fragmented
regions together in a concerted effort to throw off a common oppressor.
His book’s projected volumes, had he written them, would have all told
stories of national liberation: the Dutch and Swiss defending themselves
against Habsburg power, the American colonies battling for independence. Freeman was preoccupied with nation-building, with organizing
Europe into large states that would bring peace and stability to the continent while extending its frontiers. The thought of using federations to
create still larger entities out of the fully-formed states of Europe was
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more ambitious than he ever intended. Even the federation’s professed
ability to promote liberal government took second place to its military
capabilities. A suspicion of centralized authority may have troubled Victorian liberals, especially as the French Second Empire came to embody
their worst fears. But it is hard to comprehend how a federation of
Balkan monarchies would have extended the political benefits of the
small New England town to that troubled region. Far easier to see how
it would have united the Balkan nations in an offensive league aimed at
putting an end to Ottoman domination.
© Timothy Lang | Amherst, Massachusetts

20 Freeman and Victorian Federalism

Notes
1

Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, edited by J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963–1991), 19: 553, 560.

2

The literature on federalist thinking in nineteenth-century England
is quite extensive. As the following titles suggest, most historians of
the subject place it in the context of either Irish home rule or imperial federation. No one, as far as I am aware, has seen English federalism in the mid-Victorian period as a response to the nationalities
question on the continent. I have found the following most insightful: Michael Burgess, “Empire, Ireland and Europe: A Century of
British Federal Ideas,” Federalism and Federation in Western Europe,
edited by Michael Burgess (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 127–
152. John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over
the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870–1921 (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989). The Federal Idea, Volume 1, The History of Federalism from Enlightenment to 1945, edited
by Andrea Bosco (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991), particularly the essays by John Pinder, George Boyce and Michael
Burgess. John Kendle, Federal Britain: A History (London: Routledge, 1997). This last book by John Kendle is the best general survey of the subject.

3

Edward A. Freeman, History of Federal Government, from the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Disruption of the United States
(London: Macmillan, 1863).

4

W. R. W. Stephens, The Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman
(London: Macmillan, 1895). J. W. Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 155–228. Stefan Collini, Donald Winch and
John Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in NineteenthCentury Intellectual Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983).

Freeman and Victorian Federalism 21
5

Edward A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and
Italy, second edition, edited by J. B. Bury (London: Macmillan,
1893), 69.

6

There is a tendency among modern-day federalists to present the
Victorians as though they should have been sympathetic to the idea
of a federal Europe. See for example John Pinder, “The Federal Idea
and the British Liberal Tradition,” The Federal Idea, 99–118.

7

Some historians of British federalism have seemed surprised, even
disappointed, that Freeman was not prepared to apply his federalist
principles to Britain. John Kendle, for example, writes: “It was clear
that writers such as John Stuart Mill, Edward Freeman, James
Bryce … were all thoroughly familiar with the federal idea and they
provided sound expositions of its nature and operation but not one
of them was prepared to push the boundaries of theoretical discussion and explore its possibilities for the British state.” (Federal
Britain, 172.) Kendle, however, has missed the important point
that Freeman, Acton and Bryce were all thinking about continental,
not British, problems when they first formulated their views on
federalism.

8

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 7.

9

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 2–3.

10

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 12–13.

11

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 13–14.

12

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 30–31.

13

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 29, 32, 37.

14

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 42–44, 46–48.

15

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 61–62.

22 Freeman and Victorian Federalism
16

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 62–63.

17

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 64–65.

18

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 67–68, 77–80.

19

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 81, 82.

20

Henry Sidgwick, for example, who lectured on federalism in the
1880s and 1890s, followed quite closely Freeman’s line of argument. See Henry Sidgwick, The Development of European Polity
(London: Macmillan, 1903), 135–140.

21

Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 19: 390, 411. For Grote and the
controversy over Athens, see Frank M. Turner, The Greek Heritage
in Victorian Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981),
187–234. For Freeman’s appreciation of Grote as the “zealous and
fervent champion of the parent state of justice and liberty,—the
great Democracy of Athens,” see Edward A. Freeman, “Grote’s History of Greece,” North British Review, American edition, 25 (May
1856): 75.

22

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 176.

23

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 180–181.

24

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 553–554.

25

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 289, 303.

26

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 381.

27

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 199, 198.

28

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 209, 214–216.

29

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 218.

30

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 616.

Freeman and Victorian Federalism 23
31

Edward A. Freeman, “Ancient Greece and Mediæval Italy,” Oxford
Essays (London: J. W. Parker, 1857), 167.

32

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 617.

33

Edward A. Freeman, “A Review of My Opinions,” The Forum, 13
(April 1892): 148–149.

34

Edward A. Freeman, “What Are the Greeks?” The Spectator, 27 (16
December 1854): 1333–1334. Edward A. Freeman, “The Greek
Kingdom and the Greek People,” Edinburgh Review, 103 (April
1856): 402, 416. Freeman, Federal Government, second edition,
554–555.

35

For the development of Freeman’s opposition to the Ottomans and
his support for Balkan nationalism, see the letters that he wrote
under the following headings to the editor of the Spectator: “Russians, Turks, Greeks, Slaves, and Danes,” The Spectator, 26 (29 October 1853): 1037–1038. “The Revolt in Epirus,” The Spectator, 27
(25 March 1854): 337–338. “What Are the Greeks?” The Spectator,
27 (2 December 1854): 1259–1260. “What Are the Greeks?” The
Spectator, 27 (16 December 1854): 1333–1334. “Peace or War,” The
Spectator, 28 (21 April 1855): 407–408. “States and Nations,” The
Spectator, 28 (25 August 1855): 883–884.

36

Edward A. Freeman, The History and Conquests of the Saracens, third
edition (London: Macmillan, 1877), 9–11, 14–15, 17–18, 106–
109, 138–139, 153–155. For Freeman’s general understanding of
the region’s history, see: “Greece during the Macedonian Period,”
North British Review, American edition, 21 (August 1854): 222–
236. “Finlay on the Byzantine Empire,” North British Review, 22
(February 1855): 343–375. “Mahometanism in the East and West,”
North British Review, American edition, 23 (August 1855): 242–
259. “Alexander the Great,” Edinburgh Review, American edition,
105 (April 1857): 159–177. “The Eastern Church,” Edinburgh Review, American edition, 107 (April 1858): 165–183.

24 Freeman and Victorian Federalism
37

Freeman, Federal Government, second edition, 555–556. On a
number of occasions in the 1850s, Freeman called for the creation
of a Balkan federation. See, for example: “Russians, Turks, Greeks,
Slaves, and Danes,” The Spectator, 26 (29 October 1853): 1038.
“The Greek Kingdom and the Greek People,” Edinburgh Review,
103 (April 1856): 388. “Montenegro,” The Spectator, 31 (29 May
1858): 574.

38

For Freeman’s interest in unified Germany as a federation of
monarchies, see Stephens, Life and Letters, 2: 6. For the development of his thinking on the applicability of federalism to the
Balkans, see: “The True Eastern Question,” Fortnightly Review, 24
(December 1875): 768–769. “The Geographical Aspect of the Eastern Question,” Fortnightly Review, 27 (January 1877): 85–87. “The
Austrian Power,” Fraser’s Magazine 102 (July 1880): 45. “The Position of the Austrian Power in Southeastern Europe,” The Contemporary Review, 41 (May 1882): 738, 740–741, 748.

39

Edward A. Freeman, “Federalism and Home Rule,” Fortnightly Review, 22 (August 1874): 204, 206–210, 215. Edward A. Freeman,
“Some Aspects of Home Rule,” Contemporary Review, 49 (February
1886): 153–158.

40

Edward A. Freeman, “Imperial Federation,” Macmillan’s Magazine,
51 (April 1885): 430, 444–445. Edward A Freeman, Greater Greece
and Greater Britain, and George Washington, the Expander of England: Two Lectures (London: Macmillan, 1886), 62–103.

41

Freeman, “Federalism and Home Rule,” 214.

42

Edward A. Freeman, “The Growth of Commonwealths,” Fortnightly
Review, 22 (October 1873): 454–455. See also 443–445 and 448–
449.

Freeman and Victorian Federalism 25
43

Freeman, “Federalism and Home Rule,” 210–214. Edward A.
Freeman, “Prospects of Home Rule,” Fortnightly Review, 46 (September 1886): 325–326.

44

Freeman, “Federalism and Home Rule,” 204–205, 209. Freeman,
“Prospects of Home Rule,” 318–324, 327–328.

45

Freeman, “Imperial Federation,” 436, 439–441.

